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Following the recent political rapprochement between the governments of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in March 2018, a joint commission was created to inves-
tigate the minefields along the Tajik-Uzbek border and sched-
ule their clearance.1 The Uzbek government first expressed the 
intention to remove the landmines along its borders in 2004 
and later reported the start of unilateral demining operations 
in 2005 by the Uzbek military.2–4 Less than three years later, 
Uzbek demining teams had reportedly cleared 95 percent of 
the minefields along the Tajik border.5 However, this has not 
been verified by independent organizations, and civilians still 
fall victim to landmines in that region.6
The border between the countries is still disputed and re-
mains mostly unmarked, making it difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to determine precisely on which side of the border mines 
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were laid. As recently as 2001, Uzbek forces laid anti-personnel 
landmines along the still-disputed border with Tajikistan, re-
portedly to prevent incursions from Islamic militants operat-
ing in the area.7 While it is likely that most of the minefields 
were laid on the Uzbek side of the border, Tajik authorities 
consider the overall area to have a “high degree of mine risk 
on both sides of the border.”8 
The Tajik-Uzbek border is approximately 1,230 km (764.3 
mi) long and runs along 17 districts in eastern and north-
ern Tajikistan. According to the Tajik statistical agency, 
there are about three million people living in these districts, 
who are mostly engaged in agriculture.9 The Uzbek govern-
ment claims that landmines were planted in the mountain-
ous border areas, which are difficult to monitor and control. 
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Figure 1. Mine victims on the Tajik-Uzbek border in comparison with the rest of Tajikistan.6
All figures courtesy of the authors.
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Regional Information Networks (IRIN), experts suggest up 
to 70 percent of the Tajik-Uzbek border might have been 
mined, including the flatlands.2
While mine clearance has been conducted in central 
Tajikistan and along the Tajik-Afghan border, no clearance has 
occurred along the disputed Tajik-Uzbek border. At least 157 
people have experienced mine accidents along the Tajik-Uzbek 
border, accounting for roughly half of all mine casualties in 
Tajikistan since 1999.6 Despite the risk posed by anti-personnel 
mines, no land release activity has taken place on the Tajik side 
except for limited impact surveys.10 To date, the exact locations 
of the minefields are unknown to Tajik authorities.8 
Humanitarian demining in the region clearly presents 
many technical and political challenges. However, the experi-
ences accumulated from almost fifteen years of mine action in 
other regions of the country offer many opportunities. Tajik 
national authorities, together with implementing partners, 
have established the necessary structures and coordination 
mechanisms for effective mine action in Tajikistan.
Moreover, the country has provided examples of bilateral 
and regional cooperation initiatives. For instance, the Tajik-
Afghan cross-border mine clearance project implemented 
by the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) has worked 
to address the mine contamination in Afghanistan’s Darwaz 
province. In addition, several regional explosive ordnance dis-
posal (EOD) courses were supported by the Organization for 
Security Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Office in Dushanbe. 
The courses enhanced regional EOD capability and strength-
ened defense cooperation in Central Asia and Afghanistan.
Understanding the Problem
Even though the minefields, which are reportedly defen-
sive in nature, are thought to be mostly on the Uzbek side 
of the border, there have been a series of mine accidents in 
Tajik-claimed territory.6 A great part of the problem lies in 
the fact that the Tajik-Uzbek border is still disputed and 
is mostly unmarked.11 Moreover, minefields or individual 
mines might have been moved due to natural phenomena, 
such as heavy rainfall, landslides, avalanches, or earth-
quakes, or even local citizens might have manually moved 
individual mines.8,12 
From 2011 to 2015, the Tajikistan National Mine Action 
Centre (TNMAC) coordinated mixed teams that con-
ducted non-technical survey missions to assess the risk of 
Figure 2. Mine accidents along the Tajik-Uzbek border.6
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contamination in the ten districts bordering Uzbekistan in 
Sughd province. The surveys registered 82 mine accidents and 
60 suspected hazardous areas in six of those districts.6 The 
lack of demarcation makes it easy for locals, often looking for 
fodder, firewood, or to cross the border to meet family mem-
bers, to stray across the minefields.8 TNMAC officially con-
cluded that minefields were at least 50 m (54.7 yd) into the 
Uzbek side of the border; however, three accidents occurred 
in Tajik territory.13 In the first accident, an explosive device 
was likely moved by mudslides from the mountains and then 
collected by children from the nearby village. The second and 
third accidents occurred in the same area and within a couple 
of hours when a shepherd stepped on a landmine (most like-
ly an OZM-72) in territory that had previously been cleared 
by Uzbek deminers, and when his grandson came to help, the 
grandson fell victim to another landmine. It should be not-
ed here that TNMAC’s conclusions are somewhat subjective 
because they did not have enough access to the minefields due 
to border security concerns.6,14 At least six other districts bor-
dering Uzbekistan remain to be surveyed.15
Laid according to Russian military doctrine, Uzbek mine-
fields are likely to be recorded, mapped, and mostly com-
prised of anti-personnel mines.16,17 Based on impact survey 
reports and national averages, it is possible to estimate an ini-
tial confirmed hazardous area of roughly 3.3 sq km (1.27 sq 
mi), which is calculated to take approximately three years for 
full clearance.18 When compared with the initial assessment 
proposed by IRIN in 2004, the available data on mine acci-
dents along the Tajik-Uzbek border suggest a completely dif-
ferent picture. It is estimated that only 3 percent, or 35.8 km 
(22.25 mi), of the border is mined.19 One should also take into 
account that the estimation is based on casualty data, thus 
likely to be underreported, and that not all districts along the 
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Figure 3. Mine accidents by altitude and distance from the border.6
Figure 4. Tajik-Uzbek border elevation profile.20
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Even though no mine clearance operation has taken place 
on the Tajik side of the border, the National Strategy of the 
Republic of Tajikistan on Humanitarian Mine Action ac-
knowledges the mine threat in the region. Accordingly, 
TNMAC has targeted the districts of Panjakent, Ayni, Asht, 
Isfara, Shahriston, and Konibodom for mine risk education 
and victim assistance programs.8
Mine clearance in the region is likely to be affected by ex-
treme temperatures, heavy rainfall, and landslides in spring 
and summer, and snow in winter. Limited capacity for casu-
alty evacuation further limits mine clearance activities. As a 
result, manual demining teams are only able to work about 
nine months per year in Tajikistan, without accounting for 
rest, recreation, and bad weather.11 In central Tajikistan as 
well as along the Tajik-Afghan border, demining teams work, 
on average, less than 130 days per year. Our findings indicate 
that around 50 percent of the minefields on the Tajik-Uzbek 
border were laid in flat areas and would allow for mechanical 
demining and dog detection technologies, which can consid-
erably increase the efficiency of demining operations.6,11
The involvement of international organizations in the de-
mining effort could help facilitate the interaction between the 
two governments; however, bureaucracy and rigid decision- 
making structures often delay and sometimes impede the 
work of these organizations in supporting the mine action 
program in Tajikistan.17 Furthermore, recent developments in 
international funding for the Tajik mine action program sug-
gest donor fatigue.21
Cross-border Cooperation
In spite of the many challenges presented above, the Tajik 
experience suggests there are many opportunities for de-
mining the border with Uzbekistan. Since 2003, TNMAC 
has developed national mine action standards, created a 
national mine action center, established working relation-
ships with its implementing partners, trained personnel to 
undertake quality assurance and land release up to inter-
national standards, and implemented information manage-
ment mechanisms.22–24
Moreover, previous victim assistance exchange programs 
and the current cross-border operations in Afghanistan have 
shown that TNMAC is willing and able to cooperate with re-
gional counterparts.25,26 Largely boosted by OSCE, Tajikistan 
has become a key actor in supporting regional cooperation for 
capacity building and information sharing in mine action and 
explosive hazards clearance.27
Even though political relations between Uzbekistan and 
Tajikistan have been fragile at best, demining their shared bor-
ders may present a good opportunity for closer cooperation in 
security issues. Furthermore, experienced implementing part-
ners could be tasked to carry out mine clearance in the region as 
an independent neutral third party.28 Finally, the successful start 
of a cooperation program between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan 
could lead to renewed donor interest in the region. 
See endnotes page 60
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Figure 5. Donor funding for the Tajikistan mine action program from 2010 to 2017.6
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